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Houston, Texas is famous for a number 
of reasons, but within the field of urban planning 
it is infamous for not having zoning or a 
comprehensive plan. Houston challenges the 
popular belief that a city must have zoning to 
achieve desirable planning goals. It challenges 
this belief, because the city does manage to 
achieve economic growth and housing 
affordability both of which are common goals of 
the planning profession. This thesis analyzes 
how Houston has achieved desirable planning 
outcomes without zoning?  
 
In short, the answer is Houston’s method 
of land use regulation solves the nature of the 
problem that zoning is intended to solve, but 
uses a bottom-up approach as opposed to a top-
down approach. Zoning and Houston’s method 
of land use regulation are a response to the 
inability of cities to overcome the problem of 
collective action in the wake of market failures. 
To establish this relationship, first, we will 
consider the purpose and function of traditional 
zoning. Then we will look at Houston’s 
approach and how it deviates from this 
established norm. Next, a case study will be 
presented, followed by a discussion comparing 
the advantages and disadvantages to each 
approach. The conclusion will cover what 
lessons can be learned from Houston’s land 
management strategy and what future research 
questions logically follow from the research of 
this thesis. 	  




 There is a popular belief among urban 
planners that because Houston, Texas does not 
have a formal zoning ordinance, the city is 
incapable of planning. (Mixon 2011) 
Furthermore, Houston lacks a general or 
comprehensive plan, which indicates that the city 
also does not have a formal land use strategy. 
General plans and zoning are believed to be 
synonymous with planning because zoning is the 
planner’s primary tool for achieving the goals 
and objectives established by the general plan. 
 
Houston’s style of development and land 
management challenges the conventional 
wisdom that zoning is necessary to achieve 
“good” planning practices as defined by Urban 
Land Use Planning. (Kaiser et al 2006) The 
tenants of good planning lie within the planner’s 
ability to negotiate the tensions between 
competing goals. Good planning practices seek 
an optimal balance between the goals of 
livability, ecology, economy and equity. To this 
end, planners have historically used the tool of 
zoning to guide economic development in a 
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manner that increases equity and minimizes 
environmental impacts. Houston, even without 
zoning, has had great success realizing the good 
planning goals of economy and equity but has 
neglected livability and ecology. 
 
 In January 2015, Forbes 
published an article declaring Houston the 
“fastest growing city in America.” This annual 
list is based on five factors: population growth, 
local GDP growth, year-to-year job growth, the 
unemployment rate and median annual income. 
Houston posted a population growth rate of 
1.81% in 2014, a job growth rate of 4.5%, local 
GDP growth of 3.52%, an unemployment rate of 
4.8% and a median pay of 71,900 respectively. 
(Carlyle, 2015) These statistics are largely the 
byproduct of an economic boom in oil and gas 
production. The introduction of new techniques 
and technologies has decreased investor risk 
while enabling consistent oil and gas production. 
The most notable of these techniques is the use 
of hydraulic fracturing. According to a recent 
article in the New York Times, this economic 
boom has allowed Houston to attract new 
residents at an unprecedented pace, many of 
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whom are young college graduates, an often 
coveted demographic. Among the top five cities 
attracting this coveted demographic commonly 
referred to as the millennial generation, Houston 
is the only one without zoning or a general plan 
to guide development. The other four cities, 
Nashville, Austin, Denver and Portland, have 
employed explicit strategies considered by many 
urbanists to be “best” practices for attracting 
young college graduates. These best practices 
consist of some combination of the following: 
increasing transportation and mobility options 
via public transit, increasing density and 
walkability downtown, building mixed-use live-
work neighborhoods, providing a mix of housing 
types, increasing availability of public amenities 
such as museums, parks and greenbelts, and 
promoting environmental conservation. These 
objectives are validated by survey data from the 
professional survey company Neilson and align 
more closely with the good planning goals of 
livability and ecology than those of economy and 
equity. 
 
It has yet to be determined whether or not 
the strategy of attracting young professionals 
will lead to long-term economic growth (creative 
class theory); nevertheless, the initiatives used to 
attract young professionals have placed upward 
pressure on area home prices. In 2014, the 
Houston metropolitan area’s median sales price 
for a single-family home was $198,000, while 
Austin, Denver, Portland and Nashville had 
median single-family home prices of $240,000, 
$310,000, 286,000 and $183,000 respectively. 
Though Nashville had a lower median home 
price than Houston in 2014, as recently as 2012, 
Houston’s average annual wage adjusted cost of 
living was $75,256, while Nashville’s was 
$59,787 (Kotkin 2013). This suggests it may be 
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cheaper to live in Houston than Nashville, 
despite Houston’s higher home prices. The fact 
that Houston is attracting millennials at a faster 
rate than its aforementioned competitors shows 
that the good planning goals of economy and 
equity may outweigh those of livability and 
ecology (Miller 2014). Regardless, it cannot be 
denied that Houston is achieving some goals 
generally considered as desirable outcomes of 
good planning. This brings us to the question at 
the heart of this thesis: How has Houston 
achieved desirable planning outcomes without 
zoning? 
  
 First, we will consider the purpose and 
function of traditional zoning. Then we will look 
at Houston’s approach and how it deviates from 
this established norm. Next, a case study will be 
presented, followed by a discussion comparing 
the advantages and disadvantages to each 
approach. The conclusion will cover what 
lessons can be learned from the Houston case 
and pose future research questions that logically 




History of Zoning 
 
Zoning came about in 1916 when New 
York City became the first US city to adopt a 
comprehensive citywide zoning ordinance as a 
tool for mitigating negative health effects from 
undesirable uses. Historically the goal of zoning 
was to separate land uses to limit the negative 
impacts of industrial and manufacturing 
businesses on residences. Some of the negative 
aspects of living near industrial uses are noise, 
smoke, dust, fire hazards, pollution, and 
psychological and aesthetic effects deemed 
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harmful to the well-being of a city’s residents. 
Zoning is a way to ensure that any nuisances 
caused by these undesirable uses are mitigated 
and ideally avoided all together. Zoning provides 
a mechanism for solving a variant of the tragedy 
of the commons, a theory that proposes that 
individuals acting in their own rational self-
interest will do things harmful to the group as a 
whole (Kaiser et al 2006). Garrett Hardin coined 
the term and intended for the ‘commons’ to refer 
to the depletion of resources; but in this scenario, 
the commons refers to the space we share. It may 
be rational from an economic perspective 
(because the price is low) to build a factory 
inside a residential block, but this would 
negatively affect the group or neighborhood as a 
whole. 
 
The practice of zoning was validated 
from a legal standpoint in 1926, when the 
Supreme Court ruled on the Village of Euclid, 
Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. This landmark case 
set a precedent that has allowed zoning to 
become a ubiquitous instrument used by nearly 
every major U.S. city, with the exception of 
Houston, to ensure the health and safety of the 
city’s community. The court found zoning to be 
a rational and an acceptable use of the police 
power (Festa 2013). 
 
Basics of Zoning 
 
This section elaborates on the concept of 
zoning and provides a basic understanding of 
how it works, its purpose and the various 
functions it can serve for cities. As previously 
mentioned, the original purpose of zoning was to 
separate incompatible uses. This is a commonly 
accepted practice that is used nationwide and is 
usually created in accordance with a city’s 
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general or comprehensive plan (Mixon 2011). In 
many cases, there will be a series of plans nested 
within one another. Depending on the 
arrangement of the government, the plans could 
follow some version of the following logic: a 
regional plan is created prescribing broad 
overarching goals for the region, next each city 
or county, depending on which is larger and 
where the proper authority lies, creates a more 
detailed plan with policies and goals geared 
towards accomplishing the regional goals but on 
a citywide scale. Responding to these plans, 
neighborhoods may create their own district 
wide plan, and small area plans may even be 
created to cover just a few blocks within a 
neighborhood. The goal is to achieve vertical 
consistency within the network of plans, 
resembling an urban quilt of diverse 
neighborhoods.  
 
 Zoning is one of the main tools used to 
carryout the goals and objectives of the general 
plan. An area may be zoned for a wide variety of 
uses, but there are five to six generally accepted 
land classifications common to most cities. 
These classifications are residential, commercial, 
industrial, conservation (open space and 
parkland), special and mixed use. Each category 
can have multiple subclasses. For instance, 
within residential zones, some areas will be 
designated for single-family detached homes, 
other areas for multi-family attached row house 
style homes and others for high-rise apartment 
buildings. When zoning first became popularized 
in the 1930’s, it was often referred to as 
Euclidean zoning because Euclid was the victor 
in the previously mentioned case, Euclid v. 
Ambler. Euclidean zoning is also known as 
single-use zoning. However, planning has 
evolved and mixed-use zoning is becoming more 
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popular among planners and urbanists. 
 
Within mixed-use zones or districts, there 
may be some combination of residential, 
commercial and retail stacked on top of one 
another and hopefully some parkland or public 
plaza space nearby. Certain uses are still 
prohibited within these mixed-use districts, but 
the goal is to promote a vibrant and walkable 
urban space that is more flexible in terms of 
opportunity for different uses than the rigid 
Euclidean style zoning of the past.  
 
Beyond setting up districts and 
designating land uses, modern zoning regularly 
specifies qualities pertaining to the physical 
environment, including set backs from the street, 
sidewalk widths, height, bulk and footprint a 
building can occupy. Some codes, referred to as 
form-based codes, set very specific design 
guidelines for the façades aesthetic quality, 
window heights, the provision of light and air, 
the layout of parking spots, and placement of 
trees and benches. Basically, every aspect of the 
physical environment can be in some way 
subjected to or shaped by a form-based code. 
Even details such as the shape of the lip of each 
stair or the slope of a staircase may be the 
subject of a form-based code. For example, New 
York City has a whole host of design guidelines 
recommending ideal staircase design. 
 
With such rigorous standards and 
limitations, exceptions must be made; these 
exceptions are known as a variance. The 
department of city planning or some other 
regulatory body oversees the compliance with 
the zoning code and will regularly approve 
variances. Today zoning has become 
complicated and includes numerous variations 
5
and philosophies for creating and implementing 
the ideal code for any given context. Some 
popular movements related to zoning are the 
transect method, use-based codes, SMART 
codes and intelligent urbanism, all concentrating 
on how to best arrange our cities and ultimately 
achieve the goals set out in the general plan. 
Houston has neither a general plan nor a formal 
zoning ordinance. In light of this fact, Houston’s 
management of land uses in the absence of 
zoning is the focus of the following section. 
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1
4) Public Choice Framework 
 
Public choice theory is primarily focused 
on the provisions of public goods but can be 
applied when thinking about private goods as 
well. Public goods are those that are not 
excludable and are non-rivalrous. This means 
2
two things, first that no person or group can be 
excluded from its use and that consumption of 
the good does not prevent others from also 
consuming it. Zoning is widely considered to be 
a public good in that everyone has access to 
zoning, and that one person’s use of zoning does 
not diminish another person’s ability to use it. 
Similarly, deed restrictions also function as a 
public good, in that they are not excludable. Any 
neighborhood that achieves at least a 60% vote 
from homeowners on a given block will receive 
deed-restricted status. Deed restrictions are also 
non-rivalrous because one block receiving deed-
restricted status does not prevent any other 
neighborhood block from receiving similar 
restrictions. The fact that zoning and Houston’s 
style of land use regulation are administered as 
public goods is important to keep in mind 





The collective action problem is one 
where a group would all benefit from a certain 
action or policy outcome, but no single 
individual is directly burdened enough to take 
action. And even if they did take action, the cost 
would be high and the individual would not have 
enough leverage to change the outcome. 
Consequently, it would require collective action 
to change the outcome, meaning a sufficient 
number of individuals and groups who are all 
being negatively affected must come together 
and agree on a preferred outcome. Because each 
individual is only minimally affected by the 
undesired outcome and the transaction cost of 
achieving a sufficient level of collective action is 
greater than the benefit of a winning outcome, it 
is often irrational to attempt collective action in 
	   12	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the first place. 
 
Free riders exacerbate the problem of 
collective action. Free riders are those 
individuals who will benefit from the collective 
actions taken by others, specifically in the 
provision of public goods, but do not help supply 
or pay for the good but instead free ride. (Olson, 
1965) The problem of free riding gets worse as 
the size of the group increases, making collective 
action more difficult. Conversely, if the group is 
small then the incentive to free ride diminishes 
and collective action is easier. The relationship 
that governs this trade-off is one of concentrated 
benefits versus diffuse cost. The more people 
that need to coordinate to solve a particular 
collective action problem, the higher the 
transaction cost and the less each individual will 
be negatively affected by a losing outcome, thus 
increasing the incentive to free ride. 
 
This suggest a threshold may exist where 
collective action makes rational sense for small 
groups, where each individual has a large enough 
stake to take action. The transaction cost is low 
because group coordination is easier within 
smaller groups. However, as group size increases 
and collective action becomes more difficult to 
achieve, eventually a threshold will be crossed 
where collective action no longer seems viable or 
rational. When the group becomes too big, the 
individual benefits to overcoming the problem 
are too small and there is an incentive to free 
ride. It is important to keep in mind that free 
riders will not exist in situations where 
participation is required to receive benefits, as is 
the case with most private goods. (Olson, 1965)  
 
The free rider problem and the theory of 
the tragedy of the commons are just two of the 
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many types of market failures associated with 
the provision of public goods. In most cases, 
these market failures result in government 
intervention, unless they can first be resolved 
through collective action. In sum, many 
government programs and institutions especially 
at the municipality level have been created as a 
result of society’s inability to achieve collective 
action in the wake of market failures.  
 
The following example illustrates the 
nature of the collective action problem that arises 
as a result of market failures associated with the 
tragedy of the commons. An industrial plant 
opens up downstream from a town and begins 
dumping waste into the river affecting the health 
of a large majority of the towns’ people, many of 
whom help operate the factory, most residents 
are angry but no one has died and everyone is 
being affected but only mildly. Everyone in the 
town, with the exception of the plant’s owner 
and a few of the higher ups, agrees that 
something must be done about the plant dumping 
its waste in the water supply. But, no one can 
agree on the proper solution. If the town’s people 
could come together with one agreed upon 
strategy, they would have enough leverage to run 
the plant out of town. One solution would be to 
organize a boycott and refuse to work for the 
plant. However, no solution can be agreed upon 
and collective action is not achieved. The 
alternative solution is to empower the 
government to intervene on the public’s behalf 
by using zoning or another mechanism that 
accomplishes the same outcome. 
 
The creation of land management controls such 
as zoning are a response to market failures like 
the one described in the example above. In that 
particular example, the waste being dumped into 
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the water poses a risk to the public health, but 
the size and scale (citywide) of the issue is too 
large to be solved through collective action. 
Therefore, it is rational to use a top-down zoning 
mechanism to mitigate the market failures and 
negative externalities on behalf of the public. 
The use of zoning has been successful in 
alleviating the collective action problem. The 
government uses its police power, which if 
called upon is often enforced by the courts, to 
solve the collective action problem. The 
government seeks to solve the collective action 
problem in order to implement good planning 
practices that strike the optimal balance between 
economy, equity, ecology and livability. Though 
zoning is the most popular approach, Houston’s 
system of regulating land uses solves the 
collective action problem using a bottom up 
framework.  
 
The previous section relating to 
Houston’s land use regulations concludes by 
saying that the twin tools of deed restrictions and 
the ordinance code accomplish the two primary 
goals of zoning, to separate incompatible uses 
and to raise property values while maintaining 
the character of the community for the future.  
Though Houston’s approach differs from the 
traditional one of zoning, it appears to achieve a 
similar result.  
  
The key to the effectiveness of deed 
restrictions in solving the collective action 
problem goes back to the notion of concentrated 
benefits versus diffuse cost. The benefits from 
receiving deed-restricted status can be 
tremendous, both in monetary terms and in terms 
of preservation. Furthermore, the cost of 
attaining deed-restricted status is not spread over 
a large group, and everyone on the block stands 
6
to gain substantially from becoming a deed 
restricted block Additionally, Houston’s process 
for enacting deed restrictions allows for easy 
coordination and cooperation on a scale that is 
manageable. The combination of small group 
size and large benefits from achieving collective 
action discourages individuals from being free 
riders. 
 
Another reason the deed restrictions 
process is successful is because the structure of 
these groups is reinforced through civic groups 
and strong neighborhood ties. Thus, neighbors 
are able to hold one another accountable. In 
general, the ability to coordinate with the 
neighbors on your block is an easier collective 
action problem to overcome than those where the 
affected persons are unconnected to one another.   
 
As for Houston’s ordinance code, it 
functions similarly to a performance zoning 
code. (Goldstein 2004) In essence, ordinances 
are a top-down mechanism enforced by the 
Department of Planning and Development that 
are intended to serve the original purpose of 
zoning, to mitigate the negative affects of 
incompatible uses on nearby residences. But 
instead of governing by land use in designated 
districts, the ordinance code governs by function 
or performance.  Regardless of the use, if 
occurring in a residential neighborhood and 
causing a nuisance or posing a public health risk 
to residents, it is likely subject to one or more 
ordinances within the city’s code. Performance-
zoning codes are often considered to be more 
flexible than traditional zoning ordinances and 
can be administered in a more targeted way than 
traditional zoning ordinances, mostly because the 
actual zones or districts are irrelevant. It is about 
regulating the attributes of the use, rather than 
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7
the use itself. In this way Houston’s ordinance 
code resembles traditional zoning practices that 
inherently solve the collective action problem 
because the city government enforces the code. 
 
Another reason why Houston’s method 
of land use regulation solves the collective action 
problem is the faith it places in market-oriented 
solutions. The city is willing to tolerate an 
occasional market failure, relying on the long-
term view that the market will eventually adjust 
and self-regulate.  Admittedly, this is not an 
entirely novel perspective, as many cities place 
faith in markets. However, Houston stands apart 
from the rest because of its patience to “wait and 
see what happens.” Whether or not you believe 
that the market helps solve the problem of 
collective action is based on whether or not you 
believe that market forces self-regulate in a 
desirable way, as in the invisible hand scenario, 
or you believe unregulated capitalist markets will 
inevitably lead to the tragedy of the commons 
scenario. It is probable that the two conditions 
exist simultaneously, but on balance, which is 
having the stronger effect.  
 
The public policies of Houston reflect its 
belief that individuals motivated by their own 
rational self-interest can produce benefits for 
society at large. Therefore, if regulations are a 
response to the failures of groups to achieve 
collective action in the presence of negative 
externalities caused by market failures and the 
tragedy of the commons is an example of such a 
market failure. Then the opposite is likely true, 
meaning that if the invisible hand is at work then 
it produces positive externalities by way of 
market corrections, thus as a result helps solve 
the problem of collective action.  
 
1
5) Ashby High Rise Case Study –  
 
In 2007, Buckhead Investment Partners 
acquired Maryland Manor, an old garden 
apartment on the corner of Bissonnet and Ashby 
along a low-rise commercial corridor. Their 
original plan was to construct a 23 story multi-
use development consisting of a five-level 
parking garage and 18 floors of apartments. Even 
though the proposed structure was allowed as of 
right, residents in the nearby single-family 
neighborhoods objected to the project. The 
opposition arose immediately after the 
developers had informed the neighborhood 
association of its plan for the site. The court 
describes the pushback as “rapid and intense;” a 
neighborhood group called “Stop Ashby High 
Rise” was formed with protesters at the site and 
numerous signs opposing the project were posted 
throughout the adjacent neighborhoods. (Wilson 
2014) A website was also created to help 
community members and residents get involved 
and follow the project’s progression. 
 
On September 21st, 2007, the city 
responded to the neighborhood outcry by 
rescinding a previously approved permit, which 
had approved Buckhead’s Traffic Impact 
Analysis for the site. From this moment on, what 
8
Recently Houston’s resolve was tested 
and some residents, experts and media 
personalities were clamoring for the city to enact 
a citywide zoning ordinance. Yet, in many ways 
the Ashby High Rise development, which is the 
focus of the next section, is a testament to the 
city and its resident’s conviction that bottom-up 
collective action produces better results than top-
down planning regimes.  
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had been a painless collaboration between 
Buckhead and the city, turned into a never-
ending battle of permit submissions and 
subsequent denials. The city government was 
committed to using every available tool at their 
disposal to bring the project to a screeching halt. 
In one of the many efforts to thwart the project, 
the city began drafting an “emergency” High-
density ordinance directly aimed at the Buckhead 
development. There was one problem with this 
strategy; the project had vested rights that had 
been created prior to the passage of the 
ordinance. In light of this fact, the city council 
scrapped the emergency high-density ordinance. 
This left the city council with few available 
options. As the city council became more and 
more desperate, it looked for new and innovative 
ways to block the project.  
 
Ultimately, a new interpretation of the 
Driveway Permit Ordinance was used to 
successfully halt the project. This obscure 
ordinance was rarely, if ever used, but a re-
interpretation by the city council once again 
derailed the Ashby High Rise development. The 
original site design included a public plaza, a 
pedestrian friendly environment that helped 
mesh the apartment building with the existing 
neighborhood, as well as a spa and other 
commercial office uses. To conform to the city 
councils new interpretation of the Driveway 
Permit, Buckhead had to remove the public 
plaza, spa and some of the planned commercial 
office developments from its site design. 
 
However, Buckhead reserved the right to 
appeal previous permit denials for the original 
3
site design, but the appeals process did not yield 
better results. After all of their options had been 
exhausted,, Buckhead Investment Partners filed a 
suit against the city on the basis that previous 
permit applications had been wrongfully denied. 
“The action was originally filed in the 151st 
District Court of Harris County, but was 
subsequently removed to federal court by the 
City of Houston.” (Wilson 2014) In February of 
2012, the federal action was settled and a 
compromise was struck between the city and the 
developers. The developers agreed to dismiss the 
lawsuit after receiving permit approvals for a 
design that closely resembled their original plan, 
with the notable exception that the building be 
only 21 stories and not 23 stories as was 
originally proposed. (Wilson 2014) 
 
 Nevertheless, this is not the end of the 
Ashby High Rise story. City hall had been 
defeated, despite its many attempts to use 
various interpretations of the local ordinance 
code to inflict zoning-type controls on the Ashby 
development, (Mixon 2011) but neighborhood 
residents were not deterred. On May 1st, 2013, 
six residents filed suit seeking damages and a 
permanent injunction to stop the project. During 
the six months before the case went to trial, 
another 39 plaintiffs had joined the suit, bringing 
the total number of homes to 30. On November 
19th, 2013, the trial commenced and ended on 
December 17th, with the jury verdict awarding 20 
of the 30 residents damages of up to $1.6 million 
dollars but denied their motion for injunction. 
The final judgment issued by Judge Randy 
Wilson found that the new construction would 
constitute a nuisance and had already lowered 
property values and to that end awarded $1.2 
million to the 20 residents who lie in close 
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proximity to the proposed development (see 
Figure 3). However, the Judge disagreed with the 
claim that residents would experience “loss of 
use and enjoyment of their property” and 
removed any money that was to be paid out 
based on that claim. He also denied the 
plaintiff’s application for injunction.  
 
“If an injunction was issued, then a judge can 
become a one man zoning board with little 
criteria…even after developers obtained a 
building permit, developers would have no idea 
whether a proposed project would pass judicial 
scrutiny.”    
      
   Hon. Randy Wilson 
   Judge 157th Dist. Court  
 
 There are many interesting takeaways 
from this case, and it will be fascinating to see 
the long-term ramifications of this court 
decision. However, there are two takeaways that 
are most relevant to this thesis. First, this case 
demonstrates that the city did not have the proper 
authority or mechanism to stop or regulate the 
project in a way that would have created an 
acceptable outcome for both the developer and 
the residents. Second, this case shows that the 
residents were able to solve the problem of 
collective action and receive a verdict that will 
likely have a significant effect on similar 
developments.  
 
 With respect to the first takeaway, in a 
city with zoning, such a structure would 
probably never have been permitted in the first 
place. Even if the commercial corridor were 
zoned for higher densities, that would likely 
mean 8 to 10 floors at the most. Traditionally 
areas are zoned in a gradual step-function going 
5
from low to high. A two-story neighborhood 
might have a five-story garden apartment next 
door, and the garden apartment might have a 12-
story office tower next door to it, but the jump 
from a one-story detached single family home to 
a 23-story tower would be uncommon in all 
cities with a few exceptions, most notably Los 
Angeles. This reveals one of the potential flaws 
of Houston’s land management approach; the 
current regulatory structure is one of two 
extremes. In places that do not have deed 
restrictions, there are few limitations and design 
standards to guide development. While at the 
same time, many deed-restricted neighborhoods 
have rules that are far more restrictive than 
would apply with a typical zoning code (Wilson 
et al, 1993). 
 
 With respect to the second takeaway, the 
structure of Houston’s land use regulations 
empowered the residents to solve the problem of 
collective action, and as a result, most residents 
are not calling for zoning. This particular 
development was allowed to go through, but 
Figure	  3	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similar developments in other neighborhoods 
now know that citizens have the option of legal 
action. Even if they do not win, the process of 
legal action could severely delay the project, 
while adding cost. As a result, local developers 
will need to be savvier and smarter about 
working with local civic groups in earlier stages 
to avoid lengthy litigation and community 
backlash. Furthermore, the entire process reflects 
Houston’s bottom-up planning approach and 
harkens back to the invisible hand versus the 
tragedy of the commons debate. The fact that 
widespread calls for zoning have not occurred as 
a result of this case suggest that the city still 
believes that individual actors following their 
own self-interest can create societal benefits for 
the public at large, and in the long run will solve 
the same problems zoning is meant to solve. 
 
 We have seen how both traditional 
zoning laws and Houston’s deed restrictions and 
ordinances address the problem of collective 
action. Now, we will compare the advantages 
and disadvantages of each land management 
strategy.   
1
6) Comparison – 
 
In this section, seven criteria will be used to 
assess the advantages and disadvantages of 
zoning versus Houston’s method of land use 
regulation. These criteria are set forth below: 
 
I. Facilitates the separation of 
undesirable uses 
II. Protects property values and ensures 
preservation of neighborhood 
character  
III. Helps achieve the goals of good 
planning, specifically economy, 
equity, ecology and livability 
IV. Hinders or encourage market forces 
V. Allows for flexibility over the short 
and long run 
VI. Issues of governance 
VII. Conflict resolution 
These criteria were chosen for a multitude of 
reasons, ranging from previous academic 
literature on the subject to personal research and 
experience. 




I. Facilitates the separation of undesirable uses: 
  
 A) Zoning – Zoning does a good job of separating incompatible uses, but can be overly 
cautious about what uses are incompatible. As technology advances, the attributes of a 
particular use can change, making old assumptions about what characterizes a particular use 
seem parochial. 	  
B) Houston – The combination of the market mechanism and the city’s code of 
ordinances together do a good job of separating incompatible land uses. The ordinance code 
functions similarly to performance zoning in respect to regulating land uses, making it 
flexible and easy to administer. The one drawback is the ordinance code is not that rigorous 
and is adapted after the fact. It is only after residents have already been negatively affected by 
an incompatible land use that the city will amend the code to cover that particular 
circumstance. 
 
II. Protects property values and ensures preservation of neighborhood character:  
 
 A)  Zoning – Traditional zoning is exceptional at protecting property values and 
 preserving a neighborhood’s character. The exception here is that zoning  districts can be 
 changed often without any say from local residents based on the city’s growth management 
 strategy, which may run counter to the desire of a particular neighborhood that has been 
 targeted by the city for growth. 
 
 B)  Houston – Even with deed restrictions, Houston’s style of land management does 
 a poor job on both of these fronts. The primary issue is buffer zones and commercial 
 corridors that are adjacent to single family neighborhoods.  These areas are not platted within 
 the same subdivision and cannot be deed restricted as part of a neighborhood. The hope is 
 that the market will respond to the verdict from the Ashby case and will in the future be 
 more sensitive to local context. 
 
III. Helps achieve the goals of good planning specifically, economy, equity, ecology 
and livability: 
 
 A)  Zoning – Zoning regulations can help achieve all of these goals, not necessarily in 
 the same place, but within a region zoning can promote and help achieve all four of the goals 
 of good planning. In this respect, it is up to the planner to strike the proper  balance between 
 the four often-competing goals. 
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 B)  Houston – Houston’s bottom-up market based approach to planning has  exceled at 
 achieving the twin goals of economy and equity. As for livability and ecology, historically 
 Houston has done poorly in both of these realms but recent  efforts and new emphasis on 
 improving quality of life are beginning to take root. 
 
IV. Hinder or encourage market forces: 
 
 A)  Zoning – In general, it hinders market forces, but at the same time can be  used to 
 encourage market forces. As opposed to Houston’s approach, traditional zoning has a much 
 larger role in shaping and defining the market spatially as well as the extent to which the 
 market can maneuver within each district. 
  
 B)  Houston – The typical gut reaction and historical knowledge suggest Houston’s 
approach encourages market forces. However, as minimum lot size restrictions become more 
popular and ordinances begin to pile up, market forces could become hindered in the future. It 
is yet to be determined how recent changes to Chapter 42 (Covered in section 3) of the city’s 
code of ordinances, which allows up to 500 homes in a neighborhood to require minimum lots 
sizes for all new developments will affect future growth patterns.  
 
V. Allows for flexibility over the short and long run 
 
A)  Zoning – A codes flexibility can change depending on context and the type of code, 
but in general zoning ordinances are flexible in that new overlay districts can be added to 
satisfy emerging trends. But, it is difficult to perform a comprehensive update and rewrite of 
an entire zoning code. 
 
B) Houston – In the short term, Houston’s land management strategy is flexible, but as 
with the criteria relating to market forces, the long run trends look less promising. The city’s 
lack of land use efficiency and expansion of deed restrictions on minimum lot size, which will 
further encourage sprawl, appears to be a poor long run strategy. 
 
VI. Issues of governance 
 
A) Zoning – As previously mentioned, zoning is a top-down land use strategy and so is 
open to coercion and regulatory capture, thus creating opportunities for arbitrage. Also, the 
process of rezoning can be long, arduous and political, with many stakeholders competing for 
their preferred policy outcome. 
  
 B) Houston – Houston’s method of regulation is bottom-up and has not been validated 
through the courts as a legal system of land use regulation. Because the city uses public power 
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to fulfill a private purpose (Mixon 2011), issues arise where officials respond to complaints in 
ad-hoc ways that distinctly favor the rich and affluent. Further, city hall is open to capture by 
special interest groups, mostly comprised of white wealthy business owners. 
 
VII. Conflict Resolution 
 
A)  Zoning – Conflict resolution is straightforward with traditional zoning. In almost all 
cases, there is a board that is part of the City Planning Commission that rules on the majority 
of land use issues that may arise. These issues include zoning variances, plat approval 
changes, issues of permitting and changes to current zoning districts. 
 
B) Houston – Houston has historically favored developers over residents, using whatever 
tools at its disposal to appease developer needs. But as evidenced by the Ashby case that 
could be on the verge of change. Houston does not have a typical board that rules on land use 
disputes outside of the city’s plat approval power. If the city had zoning, the fight over the 
Ashby case would have never wound up in district court and would have been settled early on 
1
7) Conclusion – 
 
 Houston is achieving desirable planning 
goals in a different way than other cities by 
solving the collective action problem with its 
unique bottom-up approach. If Houston’s system 
had failed to separate undesirable uses, protect 
neighborhood character and bolster property 
values, the city would have voted for zoning 
long ago. Because that is not the case, one can 
infer that the people of Houston believe that their 
current method of land use regulation is 
effectively solving the issues that zoning is 
meant to solve.  
 
 This thesis acknowledges that both 
methods of regulating land use have their 
strengths and weakness when it comes to 
achieving the goals of good planning. Zoning is 
a predictable and effective way to tackle all four 
of planning’s overarching goals. The difficulty is 
in striking the proper balance between each goal 
in a manner that will most benefit the community 
2
being served. If a city’s primary goal is realizing 
economic growth and rapid development, zoning 
is probably not the answer. To achieve the goals 
of equity, ecology and livability, it is necessary 
to sacrifice a portion of potential economic 
development. To me, this is the essence of 
planning: accepting the reality that if a city only 
focuses on economic growth; the other three 
goals of equity, ecology and livability will 
suffer. Thus, when striving to accomplish a 
particular goal, the other three must always be 
kept in mind. In other words, a narrow focus is 
okay as long as one never loses sight of the 
bigger picture.  
 
 The Houston case study may be 
particularly helpful for cities looking to expand 
their population. By focusing exclusively on 
economic growth, a city is able to attract new 
residents. Until it reaches a state of maturity that 
is sustainable, then zoning can help redistribute 
the impacts of unbridled capitalism and 
economic growth. Because it is difficult for any 
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municipality to shed rules and regulations, the 
Houston wait and see approach appears to be a 
reasonable and prudent strategy for developing a 
healthy functioning city. By adopting a phased 
strategy for implementing regulations, a city is 
able to maximize the long-term benefits of 
planning and zoning, while not arbitrarily 
constraining a city’s economic potential in the 
short run before that potential has an opportunity 
to manifest itself.   
 
 It is yet to be seen whether or not a 
bottom-up approach can achieve an equitable 
balance of the four goals of planning in the long 
run. Unfortunately, Houston’s method of 
regulation is the only notable example of such an 
approach but one could imagine other ways of 
accomplishing the goals of planning using a 
bottom-up strategy.  
  
 More research needs to be conducted on 
alternative approaches to solving the collective 
action problem that use a bottom-up approach. 
This type of approach must emphasize private 
property rights and empower individuals and 
small groups to decide their own fate. Other 
questions that this thesis does not tackle but are 
related to Houston’s approach is whether or not 
the bottom-up approach will always lead to 
sprawl? Can this framework useful for complex 
dense city arrangements? Also, in the face of 
strong private property rights is it possible to 
build an effective transit system that includes 
light and commuter rail? The answer to these 
questions would shed light on the overarching 
question of whether or not Houston’s approach 
can be used to tackle all four goals that good 




 As of now the answer appears to be no it 
cannot, but only time will tell if Houston’s novel 
land use strategy will be effective for the next 
100 years, or if the city will ultimately be forced 
to revert to zoning as the city becomes more 
densely populated and requires stronger 
regulations to maintain a well functioning city. 
 
“As Houston becomes more and more urbanized 
and denser, perhaps Houston should reconsider 
whether zoning is appropriate for this City.”  
   Hon. Randy Wilson 
   Judge 157th Dist. Court  
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